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This opinion paper reviews progress with
the quantum similarity model (QSM),
which was proposed by Pothos et al.
(2013). In the QSM, concepts are asso-
ciated with subspaces, the mental state
is a state vector in a Hilbert space,
and similarity between two concepts is
computed in terms of the sequential pro-
jection, between the corresponding sub-
spaces. If there is a relevant context, this
is incorporated as prior projections (e.g.,
Figure 1).
The QSM was developed as a way to
primarily cover the empirical findings of
Tversky (1977). Tversky (1977) reported a
series of results for (mostly) simple (non-
analogical, see below) pairwise similar-
ity judgments. Tversky’s (1977) research
severely challenged the dominant similar-
ity models at that time, based on met-
ric spaces and distances. Such models are
constrained to obey the metric axioms
(as long as similarities are simple func-
tions of distances). Yet, in his seminal
work, Tversky reported violations of all
three metric axioms (minimality, symme-
try, triangle inequality), in the similarity
judgments of naïve observers. Moreover,
Tversky reported a so-called diagnosticity
effect, where the same similarity judgment
could change greatly, depending on which
other stimuli were present in a (broadly)
relevant context set.
All of Tversky’s (1977) findings reveal
intuitions about human similarity that
are, initially at least, very surprising. For
example, how can it be possible that the
similarity between (simplifying his exam-
ple) China and Korea be less than Korea
and China? Yet, some thought shows
that we indeed prefer to judge a non-
prominent object (e.g., Korea) as more
similar to a prominent one (e.g., China),
as compared to the reverse order. Equally,
how can it be possible that Austria is
seen as more similar to Sweden than to
Hungary in the context of Poland, but
more similar to Hungary than to Sweden
in the context of Norway?
Tversky’s findings have been a major
focus of subsequent theoretical work
on similarity judgments. Some of the
most prominent models are the distance-
density model (Krumhansl, 1978), gen-
eral recognition theory (Ashby and Perrin,
1988), and the generalized context model
(Nosofsky, 1988; this is a theory of cat-
egorization, rather than similarity, yet
Nosofsky considered in his influential
work how to accommodate Tversky’s find-
ings as well, e.g., Nosofsky, 1991). Limited
space prevents us from a detailed anal-
ysis of this work. Overall, we think that
while such work has provided many excel-
lent intuitions regarding human similarity,
its application to Tversky’s (1977) findings
is not uniformly satisfactory. This was a
consideration that in part motivated the
QSM.
Another motivating consideration has
been the recently proposed model for the
conjunction fallacy, based on quantum
theory (Busemeyer et al., 2011). The
conjunction fallacy is a famous result in
decision making, whereby naïve observers
judge a hypothetical person, Linda, to be
more likely to be both a Bank teller and a
feminist, than just a bank teller (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1983). Of course, such
a result is paradoxical, if one employs
the rules of classical probability theory.
Tversky and Kahneman (1983) suggested
that naïve observers in their experiment
employed a so-called representativeness
heuristic, judging Linda to be more sim-
ilar to the category of bank tellers and
feminists. Thus, at the heart of the expla-
nation for the conjunction fallacy is the
idea that participants employ a similarity
process (see also Shafir et al., 1990, for fur-
ther validations of this idea). The quantum
model for the conjunction fallacy indeed
reflects operations that involve the overlap
of a state vector (representing the men-
tal state of participants) and subspaces
(which correspond to different concepts in
the participants’ knowledge space, e.g., the
idea that a woman can be a feminist; cf.
Sloman, 1993). Thus, we were interested in
whether the quantum model for the con-
junction fallacy could be extended, more
or less as it is, to function as a model of
some aspects of similarity. This was indeed
the approach that was adopted by Pothos
et al. (2013) and the QSM is structurally
and procedurally nearly entirely equiva-
lent to Busemeyer et al’s (2011) model
for the conjunction fallacy. That the same
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FIGURE 1 | An illustration of the series of projections, relevant to the similarity of Sweden to
Austria, in the context of Poland and Hungary (assuming all countries are represented as
rays). The red line shows the series of projections: P Hungary PPoland PSwedenPAustria | ψ
〉
. Similarity is
the squared length of this projection (indicated in green). The last two projections correspond to the
similarity comparison and the first two to the context. Note, also, that projections across context
elements need be counterbalanced, but, for simplicity, in the example we illustrate only one order
(from Hungary to Poland). Finally, with this context, the similarity judgment is going to be higher,
compared to having context elements not grouped together.
principles can provide a route for
explaining both aspects of decision-
making and similarity enables the exciting
possibility that a formal unification may
be possible between these two seemingly
disparate aspects of cognition.
One emphasis of the QSM has been
the demonstration of asymmetries in sim-
ilarity judgments. In the QSM this arises
in part because concepts are represented
as subspaces. Note that the use of sub-
spaces as such is not a uniquely quantum
feature of the QSM, but the lack of com-
mutativities in projection sequence (which
contributes to the emergence of asymme-
tries) is. Subspaces can have rich inner
structure, corresponding e.g., to the char-
acteristics of a concept. Thus, concepts
for which we have more knowledge (such
as China, if we imagine ourselves in the
shoes of Tversky’s participants in 1977)
will be represented by a higher dimension-
ality subspace, contrasting with concepts
for which we have less knowledge (such
as Korea). Together with an assumption
that the mental state prior to a (simple)
similarity comparison is neutral between
the two concepts to be compared, this
enables a natural emergence of asymme-
tries in human similarity judgments, in the
predicted direction. More generally, con-
ceptually, we think that representations as
subspaces are an important advance. This
is because representations in the QSM can
have inner structure, not just in terms of
a list of characteristics, but also in terms
of how the characteristics relate to each
other. By contrast, in traditional spatial
representations, with concepts being rep-
resented as points or vectors, there is no
possibility of such structure at all. This
would be the case even in e.g., Latent
Semantic Analysis approaches to represen-
tation, which have proved extremely useful
and influential (e.g., Dumais, 2004; see
also Kitsch, 2014; Kitsch, for an insightful
comparison between the QSM and Latent
Semantic Analysis; note that in Kitsch’s
(2014), approach, vectors are given vari-
able length, and this can capture differ-
ences in degree of knowledge). But even in
Tversky’s (1977) feature-based approach,
concepts would be lists of features, and
Tversky (1977) did not consider how
dependencies among features could be
incorporated in his model.
The way violations of the triangle
inequality arise in the QSM is very simi-
lar to how Tversky (1977) suggested such
effects arise. Because in the QSM repre-
sentations are subspaces, different regions
in the overall space end up reflecting the
features characteristic of the correspond-
ing concepts. So, for example, imagine a
region in the overall space with Russia
and Cuba. This region will overall reflect
the property of communism, noting that
both Russia and Cuba are consistent with
this property (thinking again as partici-
pants in Tversky’s experiment in 1977).
Then, imagine a region different to the first
one containing Cuba and Jamaica. The
shared characteristic of Cuba and Jamaica
is their geographical proximity (they are
both in the Caribbean), so this second
region will likewise correspond to this
property. It should be hopefully straight-
forward to then see how, if Cuba is on
the boundary of the communism and
Caribbean regions in psychological space,
we can have Cuba highly similar to Russia,
Cuba highly similar to Jamaica, but Russia
and Jamaica dissimilar from each other,
thus violating the triangle inequality. It
has to be noted, however, that the trian-
gle inequality is not a challenge for stan-
dard (non-linear) distance-based models
of similarity. This is because the triangle
inequality is already violated if one relates
distance and similarity, via a non-linear
function (such as the standard exponen-
tially decaying function; Nosofsky, 1984;
Shepard, 1987). Nevertheless, it is clearly
important for a similarity model to cover
violations of the triangle inequality in a
convincing manner. Note, violations of the
triangle inequality have been the focus of
an alternative similarity model, based on
quantum theory (Aerts et al., 2011).
A great focus for further work with
the QSM concerns the diagnosticity effect.
This is because the diagnosticity effect has
proved difficult to replicate (e.g., see Evers
and Lakens, 2014). We are interested in
exploring whether the QSM model can
provide insight into why the diagnosticity
effect has proved elusive in its replica-
bility. The diagnosticity effect is also sig-
nificant because the quantum formalism,
overall, is often said to embody strong
contextual influences. So, perhaps, quan-
tum theory would be particularly suitable
for modeling context effects in similarity
judgments? Well, the diagnosticity effect
does emerge fairly naturally from the
QSM, but the mechanisms that allow this
are not the traditional contextual mech-
anisms in quantum theory (e.g., relating
to entanglement or incompatibility). In
the QSM, the contextual influences rel-
evant to the diagnosticity effect emerge
from the way prior projections are used
to capture sensitivity to the grouping of
context elements. In other words, the dif-
ficulty lies in the fact that contextual
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influences in similarity specifically depend
on the degree of grouping of some of
the options in the relevant choice set. For
example, in Tversky’s (1977) demonstra-
tion, participants were asked to decide
which country is most similar to Austria,
between Sweden, Hungary, and Poland.
More participants chose Sweden, but when
the choice set included Sweden, Hungary,
and Norway, they chose Hungary. What we
might call the “traditional” mechanisms
for contextual influences in quantum the-
ory are not sensitive to the similarity struc-
ture of the relevant options.
Contextual influences in the QSM arise
in the following way. Similarity compu-
tations are based on projecting (laying
down) the state vector (which represents
the current mental state) onto different
subspaces (which represents the concepts
relevant in the similarity task; Figure 1).
This projection operation can be highly
order dependent in quantum theory. Of
relevance, the outcome of a projection
sequence is sensitive to the grouping of
the subspaces across which projection
takes place. If the subspaces are grouped
together, then a projection sequence pre-
serves the length of the state vector and
vice versa. Thus, to account for the diag-
nosticity effect in the QSM, we postu-
lated that, in a forced choice task (such
as the one employed by (Tversky, 1977),
in his diagnosticity formulation), prior to
the projections corresponding to the ele-
ments in the similarity judgment, there
would be projections corresponding to the
other elements in the choice set. So, for
example, if a participant is considering
which between Sweden, Hungary, Poland
is most similar to Austria, and is specifi-
cally evaluating the option of Sweden, then
the similarity comparison would consist of
projections from Sweden to Austria, but
also there would be prior projections to
Hungary and Poland. Using this scheme,
with fairly minimal assumptions about
the representation of the relevant stimuli,
the diagnosticity effect emerges from the
QSM.
One important challenge in further
developing the QSM is further formaliz-
ing the way contextual influences are taken
into account. The idea of incorporating
context as prior projections works well,
but it has a heuristic feel to it. Can the
QSM be extended such that these prior
projections can be motivated in a more
rigorous way (cf. Lambert-Mogiliansky
et al.’s, 2009, quantum model of fram-
ing effects)? Moreover, as noted, can the
QSM generate any new predictions regard-
ing the emergence or suppression of the
diagnosticity effect? Since Tversky’s (1977)
work, there has not really been much fur-
ther examination (or little that has reached
the journals), which is surprising (in the
sense that the idea of context in similarity
judgments seems like a vast topic). These
questions are an important focus for our
current work with the QSM.
Another important focus concerns so-
called analogical similarity judgments
(e.g., Goldstone, 1994; Gentner and
Markman, 1997). Analogical similarity
refers to the idea that, for example, if we
are comparing two people, Jim and Jack, if
they both have black hair, this will increase
their similarity, but if Jim has black hair
and Jack has black shoes (and blond hair),
this will have less impact on their similar-
ity. That is, work on analogical similarity
recognizes that objects often consist of
separate components. Commonalities on
matching components (e.g., black hair)
increase similarity more so than com-
monalities on mismatching components
(e.g., black hair and black shoes). It is cur-
rently unclear whether there is a genuine
distinction between cognitive processing
corresponding to basic similarity tasks (as
in Tversky, 1977) and analogical similar-
ity ones (some researchers have suggested
that different cognitive systems may medi-
ate the two types of judgments; Casale
et al., 2012). Nevertheless, there have been
largely separate corresponding literatures,
with different objectives. We think that
the QSM can be extended to incorporate
analogical similarity, because quantum
theory already has extensive machinery in
place for combining individual compo-
nents into a whole (cf. Smolensky, 1990).
We have been pursuing an approach based
on tensor products and we are optimistic
that a concrete proposal will be forth-
coming soon (Pothos and Trueblood,
2015).
Finally, the QSM is only part of a
broader effort within the quantum cog-
nition community to understand simi-
larity using quantum processes. A more
challenging, though important objective,
would be to examine the formal relation
between QSM and, for example, Aerts’s
(2009) model for conceptual combina-
tion or Lambert-Mogiliansky et al.’s (2009)
model of framing effects.
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